Designing Efficient Resource Sharing For Impatient Players Using Limited
  Monitoring by van der Schaar, Mihaela et al.
Designing Efficient Resource Sharing For Impatient Players
Using Limited MonitoringI
Mihaela van der Schaara, Yuanzhang Xiaob, William Zamec
aDepartment of Electrical Engineering, UCLA. Email: mihaela@ee.ucla.edu.
bDepartment of Electrical Engineering, UCLA. Email: yxiao@ee.ucla.edu.
cCorresponding Author Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095
Email: zame@econ.ucla.edu; Telephone 310-985-3091
Abstract
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except
for pure public goods, each agent’s use creates a negative externality; often
the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in
the short run. We show that, paradoxically, the impossibility of efficient
sharing in the short run enhances the possibility of efficient sharing in the
long run, even if outcomes depend stochastically on actions, monitoring is
limited and users are not patient. We base our analysis on the familiar frame-
work of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, but we extend the
framework to view the monitoring structure as chosen by a designer who
balances the benefits and costs of more accurate observations and reports.
Our conclusions are much stronger than in the usual folk theorems: we do
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online construction of equilibrium strategies.
Keywords: repeated games, imperfect public monitoring, perfect public
equilibrium, efficient outcomes, resource allocation games
JEL: C72, C73, D02
IThis research was supported by National Science Foundation (NSF) Grants No.
0830556, (van der Schaar, Xiao) and 0617027 (Zame) and by the Einaudi Institute for
Economics and Finance (Zame). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of any funding agency.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier November 20, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
30
9.
02
62
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
 Se
p 2
01
3
1. Introduction
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource – a physical resource, a
prize, a market – is nearly ubiquitous. Unless the resource is a pure public
good, each agent’s use of the resource imposes a negative externality on other
users. Hence (self-interested, strategic) agents will find it difficult to share the
resource efficiently, at least in the short run. In some circumstances – those
we focus on in this paper – the negative externality is so strong – competition
for the resource is so destructive – that it will be impossible for users so share
the resource efficiently, at least in the short run. The purpose of this paper is
to show that – perhaps paradoxically – the impossibility of efficient sharing
in the short run enhances the possibility of efficient sharing in the long run
– even when outcomes depend stochastically on actions, monitoring is very
limited and players are not very patient.
We formalize our analysis using the familiar framework of repeated games
with imperfect public monitoring but with important differences in both the
formulation and the conclusions. With respect to the formulation, the impor-
tant difference is in the way we view the monitoring structure. In the usual
models of games with imperfect public monitoring, the monitoring struc-
ture is viewed as exogenous and fixed. In the canonical model of Green and
Porter (1984) for instance, the players compete in a Cournot quantity-setting
game but receive feedback only about market prices (rather than quantity
choices of other firms) which are determined by random market demand.
We are motivated by the many situations in which the feedback received by
the players arises from the action choices of a strategic actor – the designer
–who must weigh (among other considerations) the trade-offs between more
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accurate observations of player actions and more accurate reports provided
to players about those observations on the one hand and the costs and conse-
quences of observations and reports on the other hand. Consider for instance
a repeated contest (for details see Example 2 in Section 3). In each period,
players choose effort levels which determine (stochastically) the contest win-
ner. The designer (in this case the contest operator) does not observe effort
– and so certainly cannot announce it – but does observe the identity of the
winner, and could announce that. However announcing the identify of the
winner would violate the privacy of the winner and the losers; if privacy is
valued, the designer must weigh the trade-off between the value of maintain-
ing privacy and the (possible) efficiency gain of making more information
public. Because we wish to emphasize the role played by this and similar
choices of the monitoring structure we formalize an elaborated model in
which the choice of the monitoring structure – both what the designer ob-
serves and what the designer announces – is made explicit. However, the
reduced form that results from our elaborated model once the designer has
chosen a monitoring structure looks just the same as the reduced form that
is familiar from the standard model of repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring.
With respect to conclusions, we cite three important differences: we do
not assume a rich signal structure (rather, we require only two signals), we do
not assume players are arbitrarily patient (rather, we find an explicit lower
bound on the requisite discount factor), and we provide an explicit (dis-
tributed) algorithm that takes as inputs the parameters – stage game payoffs,
discount factor, target payoff – and computes the strategy – the action to be
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chosen by each player following each public history. This algorithm can be
carried out by each player separately and in real time – there is no need for
the designer to specify/describe the strategies to be played. A consequence
of our constructive algorithm is that the strategies we identify enjoy a use-
ful robustness property: generically, the equilibrium strategies are, for many
periods, locally constant in the parameters of the environment and of the
problem.
Within our structure, we abstract what we see as the essential features of
the resource allocation problems by two assumptions about the stage game.
The first is that for each player i there is a unique action profile a˜i that i
most prefers. (In the resource allocation scenario, a˜i would be the profile
in which only player i accesses the resource.) The second is that for every
action profile a that is not in the set {a˜i} of preferred action profiles the
corresponding utility profile U(a) lies below the hyperplane H spanned by
the utility profiles {U(a˜i)}. (In the resource allocation scenario, this corre-
sponds to the assumption that allowing access to the resource by more than
one individual strictly lowers (weighted) social welfare.) We capture the no-
tion that monitoring is very limited by assuming that players do not observe
the profile a of actions but rather only some signal y ∈ Y whose distribution
ρ(y|a) depends on the true profile a, and that (profitable) single-player de-
viations from i’s preferred action profile a˜i can be statistically distinguished
from conformity with a˜i in the same way. (But we do not assume that dif-
ferent deviations from a˜i can be distinguished from from each other. For
further comments, see Examples 2 and 3 in Section 3.) We emphasize the
setting in which there are only two signals – “good” and “bad” – because
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this setting offers the sharpest results and the clearest intuition and, as we
shall see, because two signals are often enough. To help understand the com-
monplace nature of our problem and assumptions, we offer three examples:
the first is a repeated prisoner’s dilemma (although with lower cooperative
payoffs than usual), the second is a repeated contest, the third is a repeated
resource sharing game.
Not surprisingly we build on the framework of (Abreu, Pearce, and Stac-
chetti (1990); hereafter APS). Our main technical result (Theorem 1) pro-
vides conditions (on the information and payoff structures and the discount
factor) that are both necessary and sufficient for the set of payoffs that guar-
antee each player a given level of security to be self-generating. Because
every payoff vector in a self-generating set can be supported in a perfect
public equilibrium (PPE), this leads immediately to sufficient conditions for
the same sets to consist of payoff vectors that can be achieved in PPE, and an
algorithm for the corresponding PPE strategies (Theorem 2). Our robustness
conclusion (Theorem 3) follows from the nature of the algorithm. For games
with two players, other considerations lead to the conclusion that maximal
sets of PPE payoffs must have a special form and so thus to a characteriza-
tion of the maximal set of PPE payoffs (Theorem 4). A surprising aspect of
this characterization is that there is a discount factor δ∗ < 1 such that any
efficient payoff that can be achieved as a PPE payoff for some discount factor
δ can already be achieved as a PPE payoff as soon as the discount factor δ
exceeds some threshold δ∗. Patience is rewarded – but only up to a point.1
1Mailath, Obara, and Sekiguchi (2002) establish a similar result for the repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma with perfect monitoring; Athey and Bagwell (2001) establish a parallel
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The literature on repeated games with imperfect public monitoring is
quite large – much too large to survey here; we refer instead to Mailath and
Samuelson (2006) and the references therein. However, explicit comparisons
with two papers in this literature may be especially helpful. The first and
most obvious comparison is with (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994);
hereafter FLM) on the Folk Theorem for repeated games with imperfect
public monitoring. As do we, FLM consider a situation in which a single
stage game G with action space A and utility function U : A→ Rn is played
repeatedly over an infinite horizon; monitoring is public but imperfect, so
players do not observe actions but only a public signal of those actions. In
this setting, co[U(A)] is the closure of the set of payoff profiles that can be
achieved as long run average utilities for some discount factor and some infi-
nite set of plays of the stage game G. Under certain assumptions, FLM prove
that any payoff vector in the interior of co[U(A)] that is strictly individually
rational can be achieved in a PPE of the infinitely repeated game. However,
the assumptions FLM maintain are very different from ours in two very im-
portant dimensions (and some other dimensions that seem less important,
at least for the present discussion). The first is that the signal structure
is rich and informative; in particular, that the number of signals is at least
one less than the number of actions of any two players. The second is that
players are arbitrarily patient: that is, the discount factor δ is as close to
1 as we like. (More precisely: given a target utility profile v, there is some
δ(v) such that if the discount factor δ > δ(v) then there is a PPE of the
result for symmetric equilibrium payoffs of two-player symmetric repeated Bertrand games.
We are unaware of any general results that have this flavor.
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repeated game that yields the target utility profile v.) In particular, FLM
do not identify any PPE for any given discount factor δ < 1. By contrast,
we require only two signals even if action spaces are infinite and we do not
assume players are patient: all target payoffs can be achieved for some fixed
discount factor – which may be very far from 1. Moreover, because FLM
consider only payoffs in the interior of co[U(A)], they have nothing to say
about achieving efficient payoffs. Their results do imply that efficient payoffs
can be arbitrarily well approximated by payoffs that can be achieved in PPE,
but only if the corresponding discount factors are arbitrarily close to 1. By
contrast, (Fudenberg, Levine, and Takahashi (2007); hereafter FLT) do show
how (some) efficient payoffs can be achieved in PPE. Given Pareto weights
λ1, . . . , λn set Λ = sup{
∑
λiUi(a) : a ∈ A} and consider the hyperplane
H = {x ∈ Rn : ∑λixi = Λ}. The intersection H ∩ co[U(A)] is a part
of the Pareto boundary of co[U(A)]. As do we, FLT ask what vectors in
H ∩ co[U(A)] can be achieved in PPE of the infinitely repeated game. They
identify the largest (compact convex) set Q ⊂ H ∩ co[U(A)] with the prop-
erty that every target vector v ∈ intQ (the relative interior of Q with respect
to H) can be achieved in a PPE of the infinitely repeated game for some
discount factor δ(v) < 1. However, because FLT consider arbitrary stage
games and arbitrary monitoring structures, the set Q identified by FLT may
be empty, and FLT do not provide any conditions that guarantee that Q is
not empty. Moreover, as in FLM, FLT assume that players are arbitrarily
patient, so do not identify any PPE for any given discount factor δ < 1. Hav-
ing said this, we should also point out that FLT identify the closure of the
set of all payoff vectors in the interior of H ∩ co[U(A)] that can be achieved
6
in a PPE for some discount factor, while we identify only some. So there is
a trade-off: FLT find more PPE payoffs but provide much less information
about the ones they find; we find fewer PPE payoffs but provide much more
information about the ones we find.
At the risk of repetition, we want to emphasize the most important fea-
tures of our results. The first is that we do not assume discount factors are
arbitrarily close to 1. The importance of this seems obvious in all environ-
ments – especially since the discount factor encodes both the innate patience
of players and the probability that the interaction continues. The second
is that we impose different – and in many ways weaker – requirements on
the monitoring structure; indeed, we require only two signals, even if action
spaces are infinite. Again, the importance of this seems obvious in all envi-
ronments, but especially in those in which signals are not generated by some
exogenous process but must be provided by a designer. In the latter case it
seems obvious – and in practice may be of supreme importance – that the
designer may wish or need to choose a simple information structure that em-
ploys a small number of signals, saving on the cost of observing the outcome
of play and on the cost of communicating to the agents (and preserving pri-
vacy as well). More generally, the designer may face a trade-off between the
efficiency obtainable with a finer information structure and the cost of using
that information structure. (We will return to this point later.) Finally,
because we provide a distributed algorithm for calculating equilibrium play,
neither the agents nor a designer need to work out the equilibrium strategies
in advance; all calculations can be done online, in real time.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 presents the formal model; Section
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3 presents three examples that illustrate the model. Section 4 presents some
preliminary results, presenting conditions under which no efficient payoffs
can be achieved in PPE for any discount factor. Section 5 presents the main
technical result (Theorem 1); Section 6 presents the implications for PPE
(Theorems 2,3) and a comparison with FLT; Section 7 specializes to the case
of two players (Theorem 4). Section 8 returns to the examples to illustrate
both the conclusions and the general framework. Section 9 concludes. We
relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
2. Model
The reduced form of our model will closely resemble the familiar frame-
work of a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring and we state and
prove our formal results in the context of that reduced form. However, be-
cause we want to emphasize the role played by the designer, we begin by
presenting a more elaborated form.
2.1. Stage Game: Elaborated Form
There are n + 1 (potential) actors in our framework: n players and a
designer. Players are characterized by an (exogenously given) game form:
• a (measurable) space Z of outcomes
• for each player i
– a (measurable) space Ai of actions
– a (measurable) utility function ui : Ai × Z → R
• a (measurable) mapping a 7→ pi(·|a) : A = A1 × · · · × An → ∆(Z)
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We view pi(z|a) as the probability that the outcome z ∈ Z occurs when
players choose the action profile a ∈ A. Thus the joint actions of players
a ∈ A stochastically determine an outcome z ∈ Z, and each player’s realized
utility depends on its own action and the realized outcome.2 For the moment
we require only that the spaces Ai, the utility functions ui and the probability
mapping pi be measurable, so that utilities in the reduced form be defined;
but later we will insist that the spaces be compact metric and that the utility
functions and the probability mapping be continuous.
The designer is characterized by a monitoring technology:
• a set of Φ of pairs (X,ϕ) where:
– X is a (measurable) space
– z 7→ ϕ(·|z) : Z → ∆(X) is a (measurable) mapping
A pair (X,ϕ) is a measurement device.
• a set Ψ of pairs (Y, ψ) where
– Y is a (measurable) space
– x 7→ ψ(·|x) : X → ∆(Y ) is a (measurable) mapping
A pair (Y, ψ) is an announcement rule.
For the moment, we again require only that the spacesX, Y and the mappings
ϕ, ψ be measurable, but later we will insist that the spaces be compact metric
and that the mappings be continuous. Given a choice (X,ϕ) ∈ Φ we interpret
2We could incorporate actions into the space Z of outcomes so that realized utility
depended only on outcomes, but it seems useful to keep separate track of own actions.
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ϕ(x|z) as the probability that the designer measures (observes) x when the
outcome z has actually occurred. Given a choice (Y, ψ) ∈ Ψ, we interpret
ψ(y|x) as the probability that the designer makes the (public) announcement
of the signal y ∈ Y when the observation x has actually been made. A pair
of choices (X,ϕ) ∈ Φ, (Y, ψ) ∈ Ψ constitute the monitoring structure.
2.2. Stage Game: Reduced Form
The reduced form of the stage game consists of
• a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players
• for each player i
– a (measurable) space Ai of actions
– a (measurable) utility function Ui : A = A1 × · · · × An → R
• a (measurable) compact metric space of public signals Y
• a (measurable) map a 7→ ρ(·|a) : A→ ∆(Y )
We interpret Ui(a) as i’s ex ante (expected) utility when a is played and
ρ(y|a) as the probability that the signal y is observed when a is played.
2.3. Stage Game: From the Elaborated Form to the Reduced Form
To pass from the elaborated form to the reduced form we simply define
the ex ante (expected) utilities Ui(a) and and the probability distribution
ρ(·|a) over public signals as functions of the action profile a that is played.
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For a ∈ A and D ⊂ Y these are:
Ui(a) =
∫
Z
ui(ai, z) dpi(z|a)
ρ(D|a) =
∫
Y
∫
X
∫
Z
1D dψ(y|x) dϕ(x|z) dpi(z|a)
If Z,X, Y are all finite the last equation can be re-written more simply as
ρ(y|a) =
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
ψ(y|x)ϕ(x|z) pi(z|a)
Under the maintained assumptions on realized utility, outcome mapping,
measurement technology and announcement rules, the derived ex ante utili-
ties and signal distribution are measurable; if the former are continuous, so
are the latter.
2.4. The Repeated Game with Imperfect Public Monitoring
In the repeated game, the reduced stage game G is played in every period
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Given the signal structure, a public history of length t is a
sequence (y0, y1, . . . , yt−1) ∈ Y t. We write H(t) for the set of public histories
of length t, HT = ⋃Tt=0H(t) for the set of public histories of length at most
T and H = ⋃∞t=0H(t) for the set of all public histories of all finite lengths. A
private history for player i includes the public history, the actions taken by
player i, and the realized utilities observed by player i, so a private history of
length t is a a sequence (a0i , . . . , a
t−1
i ;u
0
i , . . . , u
t−1
i ; y
0, . . . , yt−1) ∈ Ati×Rt×Y t.
We write Hi(t) for the set of i’s private histories of length t, HTi =
⋃T
t=0Hi(t)
for the set of i’s private histories of length at most T and Hi =
⋃∞
t=0Hi(t)
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for the set of i’s private histories of all finite lengths.
A pure strategy for player i is a mapping from all private histories into
the set of pure actions σi : Hi → Ai. A public strategy for player i is a pure
strategy that is independent of i’s own action/utility history; equivalently, a
mapping from public histories to i’s pure actions σi : H → Ai.
We assume all players discount future utilities using the same discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and we use long-run averages, so if the stream of expected
utilities is {ut} the vector of long-run average utilities is (1 − δ)∑∞t=0 δtut.
A strategy profile σ : H1 × . . .×Hn → A induces a probability distribution
over public and private histories and hence over ex ante utilities. We abuse
notation and write U(σ) for the vector of expected (with respect to this dis-
tribution) long-run average ex ante utilities when players follow the strategy
profile σ.
As usual a strategy profile σ is an equilibrium if each player’s strategy
is optimal given the strategies of others. A strategy profile is a public equi-
librium if it is an equilibrium and each player uses a public strategy; it is a
perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if it is a public equilibrium following every
public history.
2.5. Interpretation
In our formulation, which restricts players to use public strategies, we
tacitly assume that players make no use of any information other than that
provided by the public signal; in particular, players make no use of infor-
mation that might be provided by the realized utility they experience each
period. As discussed in Mailath and Samuelson (2006), this assumption ad-
mits a number of possible interpretations, each of which is appropriate in
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some circumstances. The first is that utility is not realized until the game
terminates. The second is that the outcome z and the public signal y coin-
cide, so that realized utility depends only on own action and the public signal
(both of which are observed). The third is that – at least in the equilibria and
deviations under consideration – the information provided by realized utility
is already provided by the public signal. (See Example 2 below.) A fourth
is that even if utility is realized during play and realized utility does provide
information not provided by the public signal, this additional information is
not used. Lest this last interpretation seems odd, recall that if players other
than i follow public strategies then it is optimal for player i to follow a pub-
lic strategy as well; in particular if other players make no use of information
provided by their own realized utility then it is optimal for player i to make
no use of information provided by i’s realized utility. (Again, see Example 2
below.) Finally, it should be kept in mind that by restricting our attention
to PPE we are tying our own hands; since our objective is to support efficient
sharing, restricting to a particular class of strategies only makes our results
stronger.
2.6. Assumptions on the Stage Game
To this point we have described a very general setting; we now impose
additional assumptions – first on the stage game and then on the information
structure – that we exploit in our results.
We assume that the spaces Z,Ai, X, Y are all compact metric and that
the functions/mappings ui, pi, ϕ, ψ are all continuous; as noted this implies
that the functions/mappings Ui, ρ are continuous as well.
Set U(A) = {U(a) ∈ Rn : a ∈ A} and let co(U(A)) be the convex hull
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of U(A). For each i set
v˜i = max
a∈A
Ui(a)
a˜i = arg max
a∈A
Ui(a)
Compactness of the action space A and continuity of utility functions Ui
guarantee that U(A) and co[U(A)] are compact, that v˜i is well-defined and
that the arg max is not empty. For convenience, we assume that the arg max
is a singleton; i.e., the maximum utility v˜i for player i is attained at a unique
strategy profile a˜i.3 We refer to a˜i as i’s preferred action profile and to
v˜i = u(a˜i) as i’s preferred utility profile. In the context of resource sharing,
a˜i will typically be the (unique) action profile at which agent i has optimal
access to the resource and other agents have none. For this reason, we will
often say that i is active at the profile a˜i and other players are inactive. Set
A˜ = {a˜i} and V˜ = {v˜i} and write V = co (V˜ ) for the convex hull of V˜ . Note
that co(U(A)) is the closure of the set of vectors that can be achieved – for
some discount factor – as long-run average ex ante utilities of repeated plays
of the game G (not necessarily equilibrium plays of course) and that V is the
closure of the set of vectors that can be achieved – for some discount factor
– as long-run average ex ante utilities of repeated plays of the game G in
which only actions in A˜ are used. We refer to co[U(A)] as the set of feasible
payoffs and to V as the set of efficient payoffs.4
3This assumption could be avoided, at the expense of some technical complication.
4The latter is a slight abuse of terminology: because V is the intersection of the set of
feasible payoffs with a bounding hyperplane, every payoff vector in V is Pareto efficient
and yields maximal weighted social welfare and other feasible payoffs yield lower weighted
social welfare – but other feasible payoffs might also be Pareto efficient.
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We abstract the motivating class of resource allocation problems by im-
posing conditions on the set of preferred utility profiles. The first is made
largely for convenience (and is generically satisfied whenever action spaces
are finite); the second abstracts the idea that there are strong negative ex-
ternalities.
Assumption 1 The vectors v˜1, . . . , v˜n are linearly independent.
Assumption 2 The affine span of V˜ is a hyperplane H and all ex ante
utility vectors of the game other than the those in V˜ lie below H. That is,
there are weights λ1, . . . , λn > 0 such that
∑
λjuj(a˜
i) = 1 for each i and∑
λjuj(a) < 1 for each a ∈ A,a /∈ A˜.5
2.7. Assumptions on the Monitoring Structure
As noted in the Introduction, we focus on the case in which there are only
two signals.
Assumption 3 The set Y contains precisely two signals and ρ(y|a) > 0 for
every y ∈ Y and a ∈ A. (The monitoring structure has full support.)
We assume that profitable deviations from the profiles a˜i exist and be
statistically detected in a particularly simple way.
Assumption 4 For each i ∈ N and each j 6= i there is an action aj ∈ Aj
such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i). Moreover, there is a labeling Y = {yig, yib}
5That the sum is 1 is just a normalization.
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with the property that
aj ∈ Aj, Uj(aj, a˜i−j) > Uj(a˜i)⇒ ρ(yig|aj, a˜i−j) < ρ(yig|, a˜i)
That is, given that other players are following a˜i, any strictly profitable
deviation by player j strictly reduces the probability that the “good” signal
yig is observed (equivalently: strictly increases the probability that the “bad”
signal yib is observed).
The import of Assumption 4 is that all profitable single player deviations
from a˜i alter the signal distribution in the same direction although perhaps
not to the same extent. We allow for the possibility that non-profitable
deviations may not be detectable in the same way – perhaps not detectable
at all – and for the possibility that which signal is “good” and which is “bad”
depend on the identity of the active player i.
3. Examples
The assumptions we have made – about the structure of the game and
about the information structure – are far from innocuous, but they apply in
a wide variety of interesting environments. Here we describe three simple
examples which motivate and illustrate the assumptions we have made and
the conclusions to follow. We present the first example directly in the reduced
form and the other two examples in both the elaborated and reduced forms.
Example 1: A Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
We begin by discussing a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma but with a payoff
structure slightly different from the familiar one; see Table 1. For our pur-
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poses we assume B > 2c > 2b > 0. As usual, (D,D) is a strictly dominant
strategy profile; the difference between the payoffs shown here and the usual
ones is that (C,C) is Pareto dominated by randomizing between (C,D) and
(D,C). See Figure 1.
There are two signals: Y = {yg, yb}; the probability distribution over
signals following actions is
pi(yg|a) =

p if a = (C,C)
q if a = (C,D) or (D,C)
r if a = (D,D)
(1)
where p, q, r ∈ (0, 1); for our purposes we assume p ≥ q > r. It is easily
checked that the stage game and monitoring structure satisfy our assump-
tions. (Note that yg is the good signal for both players.) As we will show in
Section 4, we can completely characterize the most efficient outcomes that
can be achieved in a PPE. To summarize the conclusion, for each discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1) write E(δ) for the set of efficient (average) payoffs that can
be achieved when the discount factor is δ. Set
δ∗ =
1
1 +
(
B−2 q
q−r b
B+2 1−q
q−r b
)
It follows from Theorem 4 that if δ ≥ δ∗ then
E(δ) = {(v1, v2) : v1 + v2 = B; vi ≥ q/(q − r)b}
Note that the set of efficient equilibrium outcomes does not increase as δ → 1;
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Table 1: Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma
C D
C (c, c) (0, B)
D (B, 0) (b, b)
COL
ROW
feasible 
payoffs
(b, b)
(c, c)
(0, B)
(B, 0)
Figure 1: Feasible Region for the Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma
as we noted in the Introduction, patience is rewarded but only up to a point.
See Figure 5.
Example 2: A Repeated Contest
We consider a repeated contest. In each period, a set of n ≥ 2 players
competes for the use of a single indivisible resource/prize each of them values
at R > 0. Winning the contest depends (stochastically) on the effort exerted
by each player; we write Ai = [0, 1] for the set of i’s effort levels (actions).
Each agent’s effort interferes with the effort of others and there is always
some probability that no one wins (the prize is not awarded) independently
of the choice of effort levels. If a = (ai) is the vector of effort levels then the
probability agent i obtains the wins the contest (obtains the resource/prize)
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is
Prob(i wins|a) = ai
(
η − κ
∑
j 6=i
aj
)+
where η, κ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters. The assumption that η < 1 reflects that
there is always some probability the prize is not awarded; κ measures the
strength of the interference. Notice that competition is destructive: if more
than one agent exerts effort that lowers the probability that anyone wins the
prize. Utility is separable in reward and effort; effort is costly with constant
marginal cost c > 0. To avoid trivialities and conform with Assumptions 1-4
we assume Rη > c and that κ > 1
2
(
η − c
R
)
.
In the elaborated form of the stage game, players are N = {1, . . . , n},
action sets are Ai = [0, 1], outcomes are Z = {z0, . . . , zn} (where z0 is inter-
preted as “no one wins” and zi is interpreted as “i wins”) and i’s realized
utility as a function of his own effort level ai and the outcome z is
ui(ai, zk) =
 R− cai if k = i−cai if k 6= i
In this context it seems natural to assume that the designer observes who
wins – how else could the prize be awarded? – so that X = Z and ϕ is
the identity. We assume that the designer wishes to preserve privacy so
announces only whether or not some player won the contest but not the
identity of the winner. Hence the reporting rule (Y 1, ψ1), (Y 2, ψ2), where
• Y 1 = {yb, yg}; ψ1(zk) = yb if k = 0, ψ1(zk) = yg if k 6= 0
• Y 2 = Z; ψ2(zk) = zk for all k = 0, . . . , n
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In the first case, the designer announces whether or not there has been a
winner; in the second case the designer also announces the identity of the
winner.
In the reduced forms of the stage game, the ex ante expected utilities are
given by
Ui(a) = ai
(
η − κ
∑
j 6=i
aj
)+
R− cai
In the first case, the signal distribution is
ρ(y∗|a)

1−∑i ai (η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if ∗ = b∑
i ai
(
η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if ∗ = g
In the second case the signal distribution is
ρ̂(yk|a) =

1−∑i ai (η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if k = 0
ak
(
η − κ∑j 6=k aj)+ if k 6= 0
Straightforward but somewhat messy calculations show that in either case
the reduced form satisfies all of our assumptions. (Player i’s preferred action
profile a˜i has a˜ii = 1 and a˜
i
j = 0 for j 6= i: i exerts maximum effort, others
exert none. Note that this does not guarantee that i wins the contest – there
may still be no winner – but the effort profiles a˜i are precisely those that
maximize the probability that someone wins the prize.)
The first reporting rule preserves privacy, the second rule does not. How-
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ever, the second reporting rule provides more information to players. Suppose
for instance that a strategy profile σ calls for a˜i to be played after a particu-
lar history. If all players follow σ then only player i exerts non-zero effort so
only two outcomes can occur: either player i wins or no one wins. If player
j 6= i deviates by exerting non-zero effort, a third outcome can occur: j wins.
With either monitoring structure, it is possible for the players to detect (sta-
tistically) that someone has deviated – the probability that someone wins
goes down – but with the second monitoring structure it is also possible for
the players to detect (statistically) who has deviated – because the probabil-
ity that the deviator wins becomes positive. Hence, with the first monitoring
structure all deviations must be “punished” in the same way, but with the
second monitoring structure, “punishments” can be tailored to the deviator.
If punishments can be “tailored” to the deviator then punishments can be
more severe; if punishments can be more severe it may be possible to sus-
tain a wider range of PPE. Which reporting rule – hence which monitoring
structure – should be chosen by the designer will depend on the tradeoff the
designer makes between preserving privacy and sustaining a wider range of
PPE. We will see a similar but even starker tradeoff in Example 3 following.
Example 3: Resource Sharing
We consider n ≥ 3 users (players) who send information packets through a
common server. The server has a nominal capacity of χ > 0 (packets per unit
time) but the capacity is subject to random shocks so the actually realized
capacity in a given period is χ−ε, where the random shock ε is distributed in
some interval [0, ε¯] with (known) distribution ν. In each period, each player
chooses a packet rate (packets per unit time) ai ∈ Ai = [0, χ]. This is a
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well-studied problem; assuming that the players’ packets arrive according to
a Poisson process, the whole system can be viewed as what is known as an
M/M/1 queue; see Bharath-Kumar and Jaffe (1981) for instance. It follows
from the standard analysis that if ε is the realization of the shock then packet
deliveries will be be subject to a delay of
d(a, ε) =
 1/(χ− ε−
∑n
i=1 ai) if
∑n
i=1 ai < χ− ε
∞ if ∑ni=1 ai ≥ χ− ε
Given the delay d, each player’s realized utility is its “power”, namely the
ratio of the p-th power of its own packet rate to the delay:
ui(a, d) = a
p
i /d
where p > 0 is a parameter that represents trade-off between rate and delay.6
(If delay is infinite utility is 0.) Formally, we identify the outcome with the
pair consisting of the vector a of packet rates and the realized shock ε, so
Z = A× [0, ε¯] and pi(·|a) = δa × ν where δa is point mass at a and ν is the
given distribution of shocks.
The designer does not observe packet rates but can measure the delay, but
with error and at a cost. Thus the space of measurements is X = [0,∞] and
the measurement technology consists of a space of maps (a, ε) 7→ ϕ(·|(a, ε)) :
A × [0, ε¯] → ∆(X). Many possible reporting technologies are possible; we
assume the designer reports only whether the measured delay was above or
6In order to guarantee that the reduced form satisfies our assumptions we assume
ε¯ ≤ 22+pχ.
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below a chosen threshold d0; say Y = {y`, yh} where y` is interpreted as
“delay was low (below d0)” and yh is interpreted as “delay was high (above
d0).”
In the reduced form, each player i’s ex-ante payoff is
Ui(a) =

api (χ− ε¯2 −
∑n
j=1 aj) if
∑n
j=1 aj ≤ χ− ε¯
api (χ−
∑n
j=1 aj)
χ−∑nj=1 aj
2ε¯
if χ− ε¯ <∑nj=1 aj < χ
0 otherwise
and the distribution of signals is
ρ(y`|a) =
∫ χ−∑nj=1 aj− 1d0
0
d ν(x) =
[χ−∑nj=1 aj − 1d0 ]ε¯0
ε¯
,
where [x]ba , min{max{x, a}, b} is the projection of x in the interval [a, b].
Note that y` is the “good” signal: deviation from any preferred action profile
increases the probability of realized delay, hence increases the probability
of measured delay, and reduces the probability that reported delay will be
below the chosen threshold.
It might seem to the reader that the players could back out realized delay
from their own realized utility and hence that announcements are irrelevant
– but this is not quite so. Players who choose packet rates greater than 0
can back out realized delay from their own realized utility but at any one
of the preferred action profiles a˜i and at any single-player deviation from
any one of the preferred action profiles a˜i, at least one player will choose
a packet rate aj = 0 and hence will experience realized utility Ui(a) = 0;
that player cannot back out observed delay. Hence announcements serve
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to (statistically) inform players who have complied of the existence of some
player who has not complied. Put differently, announcements serve to keep
all players on the same informational page.
4. Ruling out Some Efficient PPE Payoffs
Throughout this Section, we consider a fixed reduced form and maintain
the notation and assumptions of Section 2. Our ultimate goal is to find
conditions – on the discount factor among other things – that enable us to
construct PPE that achieve payoffs in V (efficient payoffs).
We first show that under certain conditions, certain efficient payoffs can-
not be achieved in PPE no matter what the discount factor is. To this end,
we identify two measures of benefits from deviation. (These same measures
will play a prominent role in the next Section as well.) Given i, j ∈ N with
i 6= j set:
α(i, j) = sup
{
uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
:
aj ∈ Aj, uj(aj, a˜i−j) > uj(a˜i)
}
(2)
β(i, j) = inf
{
uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
:
aj ∈ Aj, uj(aj, a˜i−j) < uj(a˜i), ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j) < ρ(yib|a˜i)
}
(3)
(We follow the usual convention that the supremum of the empty set is −∞
and the infimum of the empty set is +∞.)
Note that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)−uj(a˜i) is the gain or loss to player j from deviating
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from i’s preferred action profile a˜i and ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i) is the increase
or decrease in the probability that the bad signal occurs (equivalently, the
decrease or increase in the probability that the good signal occurs) following
the same deviation. In the definition of α(i, j) we consider only deviations
that are strictly profitable; by assumption, such deviations strictly increase
the probability that the bad signal occurs, so α(i, j) is either −∞ or strictly
positive. In the definition of β(i, j) we consider only deviations that are
strictly unprofitable and strictly decrease the probability that the bad sig-
nal occurs, so β(i, j) is the infimum of strictly positive numbers and so is
necessarily +∞ or finite and non-negative.7
To understand the significance of these numbers, think about how player j
could gain by deviating from a˜i. Most obviously, j could gain by deviating to
an action that increases its current payoff. By assumption, such a deviation
will increase the probability of a bad signal; assuming that a bad signal leads
to a lower continuation utility, whether such a deviation will be profitable
will depend on the current gain and on the change in probability; α(i, j)
represents a measure of net profitability from such deviations. However,
player j could also gain by deviating to an action that decreases its current
payoff but also decreases the probability of a bad signal, and hence leads to
a higher continuation utility. β(i, j) represents a measure of net profitability
from such deviations.
Because V˜ lies in the supporting hyperplane H and the utilities for ac-
7Note that if we strengthened Assumption 4 so that any deviation – profitable or not
– increased the probability of a bad signal (as is the case in Examples 1-3 and would be
the case in most resource allocation scenarios), then β(i, j) would be the infimum of the
empty set whence β(i, j) = +∞.
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tion profiles not in A˜ lie strictly below H, in order that the strategy profile
σ achieves an efficient payoff it is necessary and sufficient that σ use only
preferred action profiles: U(σ) ∈ V if and only if σ(h) ∈ A˜ for every public
history h (independently of the discount factor δ). For PPE strategies we
can say a lot more. The first Proposition is almost obvious; the second and
third seem far from obvious. (All proofs are in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. In order that v˜i be achievable in a PPE equilibrium (for any
discount factor δ) it is necessary and sufficient that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) ≤ uj(a˜i) for
every j 6= i and every aj ∈ Aj.
Proposition 2. If σ is an efficient PPE (for any discount factor δ) and i is
active following some history (i.e., σ(h) = a˜i for some h) then
α(i, j) ≤ β(i, j) (4)
for every j ∈ N, j 6= i.
Proposition 3. If σ is an efficient PPE (for any discount factor δ) and i is
active following some history (i.e., σ(h) = a˜i for some h) then
v˜ii − ui(ai, a˜i−i) ≥
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λj α(i, j)
[
ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
]
(5)
The import of Propositions 2 and 3 is that if any of these inequalities
fail then certain efficient payoff vectors can never be achieved in PPE, no
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matter what the discount factor is. In the next Sections, we show how these
inequalities and other conditions yield necessary and sufficient conditions
that certain sets be self-generating and hence yield sufficient conditions for
efficient PPE.
Proposition 2 might seem quite mysterious: α is a measure of the current
gain to deviation and β is a measure of the future gain to deviation; there
seems no obvious reason why PPE should necessitate any particular relation-
ship between α and β. As the proof will show, however, the assumption of
two signals and the efficiency of payoffs in V imply that α is bounded above
and β is bounded below by the same quantity, which is a weighted difference
of continuation values – a quantity that does have an obvious connection to
PPE.
5. Characterizing Efficient Self-Generating Sets
As in the previous Section, we consider a fixed reduced form and maintain
the notation and assumptions of Section 2. In order to find efficient PPE
payoffs we follow APS and look for self-generating sets of efficient payoffs.
Fix a subset W ⊂ co[U(A)] and a target payoff v ∈ co[U(A)]. Recall
from APS that v can be decomposed with respect to W (for a given discount
factor δ < 1) if there exist an action profile a ∈ A and continuation payoffs
γ : Y → W such that
• v is the (weighted) average of current and continuation payoffs when
players follow a
v = (1− δ)U(a) + δ
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|a)γ(y)
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• continuation payoffs provide no incentive to deviate: for each j and
each aj ∈ Aj
vj ≥ (1− δ)U(aj,a−j) + δ
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|aj,a−j)γ(y)
Write B(W, δ) for the set of target payoffs v ∈ co[U(A)] that can be de-
composed with respect to W (for the discount factor δ. Recall that W is
self-generating if W ⊂ B(W, δ); i.e., every target vector in W can be decom-
posed with respect to W .
Because V lies in the hyperplane H, if v ∈ V and it is possible to de-
compose v ∈ V with respect to any set and for any discount factor, then
the associated action profile a must lie in A˜ and the continuation payoffs
must lie in V . Because we are interested in efficient payoffs we can therefore
restrict our search for self-generating sets to subsets W ⊂ V . In order to
understand which sets W ⊂ V can be self-generating, we need to understand
how players might profitably gain from deviating from the current recom-
mended action profile. Because we are interested in subsets W ⊂ V , the
current recommended action profile will always be a˜i for some i, so we need
to ask how a player j might profitably gain from deviating from a˜i. For
player j 6= i, a profitable deviation might occur in one of two ways: j might
gain by choosing an action aj 6= a˜ij that increases j’s current payoff or by
choosing an action aj 6= a˜ij that alters the signal distribution in such a way
as to increase j’s future payoff. Because a˜i yields i its best current payoff,
a profitable deviation by i might occur only by choosing an action that that
alters the signal distribution in such a way as to increase i’s future payoff. In
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all cases, the issue will be the net of the current gain/loss against the future
loss/gain.
We focus attention on sets of the form
Vµ = {v ∈ V : vi ≥ µi for each i}
where µ ∈ Rn; we assume without further comment that Vµ 6= ∅. For lack of
a better term, we say that Vµ is regular if for each i ∈ N there is a vector
vˆi ∈ Vµ such that vˆij = µj for each j 6= i. Whether or not Vµ is regular
depends both on the shape of V and on the magnitude of µ: see Figures 2,
3, 4 for instance. A few simple facts are useful to note:
• If v˜ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j (as is the case in many resource
sharing scenarios such as Examples 2, 3) then Vµ is regular for every
µ ≥ 0.
• If Vµ 6= ∅ and Vµ is a subset of the interior of V (relative to the hyper-
plane H) then Vµ is regular.
• If v lies in the interior of V (relative to the hyperplane H) and µ =
v −  · 1 for  > 0 sufficiently small, then v ∈ Vµ and Vµ is regular.
• If Vµ is not a singleton then it must contain a point of the interior of
V (relative to the hyperplane H).
If Vµ is a singleton, it can only be a self-generating set (and hence achievable
in a PPE) if Vµ = v˜
i for i; because we have already characterized this pos-
sibility in Proposition 1, we focus on the non-degenerate case in which Vµ is
not a singleton and hence contains a point of the interior of V . Note that a
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Figure 2: µ = (0, 1/4, 0); Vµ is regular
Figure 3: µ = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2); Vµ is regular
point in the interior of V can only be achieved by a repeated game strategy
in which all players are active following some history.
The following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions on µ,
the payoff structure, the information structure and the discount factor that
a regular Vµ be a self-generating set.
Theorem 1. Fix µ; assume that Vµ is regular and not an extreme point of
V . In order that Vµ be a self-generating set, it is necessary and sufficient
that the following conditions be satisfied:
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Figure 4: µ = (1/4, 0, 0); Vµ is not regular
Condition 1 for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j:
α(i, j) ≤ β(i, j) (6)
Condition 2 for all i ∈ N and all ai ∈ Ai:
v˜ii − ui(ai, a˜i−i) ≥
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λj α(i, j)
[
ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
]
(7)
Condition 3 for all i ∈ N :
µi ≥ max
j 6=i
(
v˜ji + α(j, i)[1− ρ(yjb |a˜j)]
)
(8)
Condition 4 the discount factor δ satisfies:
δ ≥ δµ ,
1 +
1−∑
i
λiµi
∑
i
[
λiv˜ii +
∑
j 6=i
λj α(i, j) ρ(yib|a˜i)
]
− 1

−1
(9)
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One way to contrast our approach with that of FLM (and FLT) is to think
about the constraints that need to be satisfied to decompose a given target
payoff v with respect to a given set Vµ. By definition we must find a current
action profile a and continuation payoffs γ. The achievability condition (that
v is the weighted combination of the utility of the current action profile
and the expected continuation values) yields a family of linear equalities.
The incentive compatibility conditions (that players must be deterred from
deviating from a) yields a family of linear inequalities. In the context of
FLM, satisfying all these linear inequalities simultaneously requires a large
and rich collection of signals so that many different continuation payoffs can
be assigned to different deviations. Because we have only two signals, we are
only able to choose two continuation payoffs but still must satisfy the same
family of inequalities – so our task is much more difficult. It is this difficulty
that leads to the Conditions in Theorem 1.
Note that δµ is decreasing in µ. Since Condition 3 puts an absolute lower
bound on µ and Condition 4 puts an absolute lower bound on δµ this means
that (subject to the regularity constraint) there is a µ∗ such that Vµ∗ is
the largest self-generating set (of this form) and δµ∗ is the smallest discount
factor (for which any set of this form can be self-generating). This may seem
puzzling – increasing the discount factor beyond a point makes no difference
– but remember that we are providing a characterization of self-generating
sets and not of PPE payoffs. However, as we shall see in Theorem 4, for the
two-player case, we do obtain a complete characterization of (efficient) PPE
payoffs and we demonstrate the same phenomenon.
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6. Perfect Public Equilibrium
Because every payoff in a self-generating set can be achieved in a PPE,
Theorem 1 immediately provides sufficient conditions achieving (some) given
target payoffs in perfect public equilibrium. In fact, we can provide an explicit
algorithm for computing PPE strategies. A consequence of this algorithm is
that (at least when action spaces are finite), the constructed PPE enjoys an
interesting and potentially useful robustness property.
6.1. A Constructing Efficient Perfect Public Equilibria
Given the various parameters of the environment (game payoffs, infor-
mation structure, discount factor) and of the problem (lower bound, target
vector), the algorithm takes as input in period t the current continuation
vector v(t) and computes, for each player j, an indicator dj(v(t)) defined as
follows:
dj(v(t)) =
λj[vj(t)− µj]
λj[v˜
j
j − vj(t)] +
∑
k 6=j λk α(j, k)ρ(y
j
b |a˜j)
(Note that each player can compute every dj from the current continuation
vector v(t) and the various parameters.) Having computed dj(v(t)) for each
j, the algorithm finds the player i∗ whose indicator is greatest. (In case of
ties, we arbitrarily choose the player with the largest index.) The current
action profile is i∗’s preferred action profile a˜i
∗
. The algorithm then uses the
labeling Y = {yi∗g , yi∗b } to compute continuation values for each signal in Y .
Theorem 2. If the conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied, then every payoff
v ∈ Vµ can be achieved in a PPE. For v ∈ Vµ, a PPE strategy profile that
achieves v can be computed by the algorithm in Table 2
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Table 2: The algorithm used by each player.
Input: The current continuation payoff v(t) ∈ Vµ
For each j
Calculate the indicator dj(v(t))
Find the player i with largest indicator (if a tie, choose largest i)
i = maxj {arg maxj∈N dj(v(t))}
Player i is active; chooses action a˜ii
Players j 6= i are inactive; choose action a˜ij
Update v(t+ 1) as follows:
if yt = yig then
vi(t+ 1) = v˜
i
i + (1/δ)(vi(t)− v˜ii)− (1/δ − 1)(1/λi)
∑
j 6=i λjα(i, j)ρ(y
i
b|a˜i)
vj(t+ 1) = v˜
i
j + (1/δ)(vj(t)− v˜ij) + (1/δ − 1)α(i, j)ρ(yib|a˜i)
for all j 6= i
if yt = yib then
vi(t+ 1) = v˜
i
i + (1/δ)(vi(t)− v˜ii) + (1/δ − 1)(1/λi)
∑
j 6=i λjα(i, j)ρ(y
i
g|a˜i)
vj(t+ 1) = v˜
i
j + (1/δ)(vj(t)− v˜ij)− (1/δ − 1)α(i, j)ρ(yig|a˜i)
for all j 6= i
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6.2. Robustness
A consequence of our constructive algorithm is that, for generic values
of the parameters of the environment and of the problem and for as many
periods as we specify, the strategies we identify are locally constant in these
parameters. To make this precise, we assume for this subsection that action
spaces Ai are finite. The parameters of the model are the utility mapping
U : A → Rn and the probabilities ρ(·|·) : Y × A → [0, 1]. Because the
probabilities must sum to 1 and we require full support, the parameter space
of the model is
Ω = (Rn × [0, 1])A
The parameters of the problem are the discount factor δ, the constraint vector
µ and the target profile v∗; because the target profile lies in a hyperplane,
the parameter space for the particular problem is
Θ = (0, 1)× Rn × Rn−1
Let Ξ ⊂ Ω × Θ be the subset of parameters that satisfy the Conditions of
Theorem 1. For ξ ∈ Ξ, the algorithm generates an strategy profile
σξ : H → A
For T ≥ 0 we write σTξ for the restriction of σξ to the set HT of histories of
length at most T .
Theorem 3. For each T ≥ 0 there is a subset ΞT ⊂ Ξ that is closed and has
measure 0 with the property that the mapping ξ → σTξ : Ξ → HT is locally
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constant on the complement of ΞT .
In words: if ξ, ξ′ are close together and neither lies in the proscribed small
set of parameters ΞT , then the strategies σξ, σξ′ coincide for at least the first
T periods.
6.3. Comparison with FLT
As we have commented in the Introduction, our approach provides a great
deal of information about the efficient payoffs that can be achieved in PPE
but because the sets Vµ are required to have a special form, it does not find
all of them. Here we provide a simple example. We consider a 3 × 3 game.
Each player chooses from the actions {l,m, h}: Player 1 chooses rows, Player
2 chooses columns, Player 3 chooses matrices; see Table 3. (Payoffs indicated
by ∗ are irrelevant so long as Assumptions 1,2 are satisfied; we could take
∗ = 0 everywhere.) There are two signals yg, yb and the signal structure is
ρ(yg|a) =

2/3 if a = (h, `, `) or any permutation
1/2 if a = (h,m, `) or any permutation
1/3 otherwise
Note that a˜1 = (h, `, `), a˜2 = (`, h, `), a˜3 = (`, `, h) and that v˜1 = (1, .5, 0),
v˜2 = (0, 1, .5), v˜3 = (.5, 0, 1). Condition 3 implies that no regular Vµ can be
a self-generating set (because we would have to have µi > .5 for each i), so
our approach does not find any PPE. However, applying the machinery of
FLT shows that there is a discount factor δˆ < 1 for which the payoff vector
(.5, .5, .5) – indeed, any efficient payoff vector close to (.5, .5, .5) – can be
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Table 3: Payoff Matrices for the 3× 3 Game; Player 3 Chooses `, m, h (respectively)
` m h
` (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗) (0, 1, 0.5)
m (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗) (0.1, ∗, ∗)
h (1, 0.5, 0) (∗, 0.55, ∗) (0.2, 0.6, ∗)
` m h
` (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, 0.55)
m (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗)
h (∗, ∗, 0.1) (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗)
` m h
` (0.5, 0, 1) (∗, 0.1, ∗) (∗, 0.2, 0.6)
m (0.55, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗)
h (0.6, ∗, 0.2) (∗, ∗, ∗) (∗, ∗, ∗)
achieved in PPE.8 As noted in the Introduction, however, FLT provides no
information as to what δˆ must be nor does it construct PPE strategies.
7. Two Players
Theorem 1 provides a complete characterization of self-generating sets
that have a special form. If there are only two players then maximal self-
generating sets – the set of all PPE – have this form and so it is possible to
provide a complete characterization of PPE. We focus on what seems to be
the most striking finding: either there are no efficient PPE outcomes at all
(for any discount factor δ < 1) or there is a discount factor δ∗ < 1 with the
8Calculations available from the authors by request.
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property that any target payoff in V that can be achieved as a PPE for some
δ can already be achieved for every δ ≥ δ∗.
Theorem 4. Assume N = 2 (two players). Either
(i) no target profile in V can be supported in a PPE for any δ < 1 or
(ii) there exist µ1, µ2 and a discount factor δ
∗ < 1 such that if δ is any
discount factor with δ∗ ≤ δ < 1 then the set of payoff vectors that can
be supported in a PPE when the discount factor is δ is precisely
E = {v ∈ V : vi ≥ µi for i = 1, 2}
The proof yields explicit (messy) expressions for µ1, µ2 and δ
∗.
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8. Examples, Redux
In Section 3 we presented three examples to illustrate the model. We now
return to these models to illustrate our analysis and conclusions.
Example 1 Because there are only two players, Theorem 4 applies. In this
case it is easy to give explicit expressions for µ1, µ2 and for the threshold
discount factor δ∗.9 In fact µ1 = µ12 = q/(q − r)b and
δ∗ =
1
1 +
(
B−2 q
q−r b
B+2 1−q
q−r b
)
so that for every δ ≥ δ∗ the set of efficient payoffs that can be achieved in
PPE is exactly
E(δ) = {(v1, v2) : v1 + v2 = B; vi ≥ q/(q − r)b}
We stress that the set of efficient equilibrium outcomes does not increase as
δ → 1; as we noted in the Introduction, patience is rewarded but only up to
a point. See Figure 5.
Example 2 As we have noted, the choice of a reporting rule has implications
for the equilibria of the repeated game. In this case it is natural to consider
two reporting rules (Y 1, ψ1), (Y 2, ψ2) where
• Y 1 = {yb, yg}; ψ1(zk) = yb if k = 0, ψ1(zk) = yg if k 6= 0
• Y 2 = Z; ψ2(zk) = zk for all k = 0, . . . , n
9Calculations are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 5: Efficient PPE Payoffs for the Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma.
In the first rule (which is the one discussed in Section 3), the designer an-
nounces whether or not there has been a winner; in the second case the
designer also announces the identity of the winner.
As we have noted earlier, in the reduced forms of the stage game, the ex
ante expected utilities are given by
Ui(a) = ai
(
η − κ
∑
j 6=i
aj
)+
R− cai
and, with the first reporting rule, the signal distribution is
ρ(y∗|a)

1−∑i ai (η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if ∗ = b∑
i ai
(
η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if ∗ = g
40
With the second reporting rule, the signal distribution is
ρ̂(yk|a) =

1−∑i ai (η − κ∑j 6=i aj)+ if k = 0
ak
(
η − κ∑j 6=k aj)+ if k 6= 0
To be specific, suppose there are 2 players. With the first reporting rule,
there are two signals; with the second reporting rule there are three signals.
The second reporting rule provides additional information to players and
this additional information can be used to support more PPE. Suppose for
instance that a strategy profile σ calls for a˜1 to be played after a particular
history. If all the players follow σ then only player 1 exerts non-zero effort so
only two outcomes can occur: either player 1 wins or no one wins. If player 2
deviates by exerting non-zero effort, a third outcome can occur: 2 wins. With
either monitoring structure, it is possible for player 1 to detect (statistically)
when player 2 has deviated, but with the second monitoring structure it
will sometimes be the case that player 1 can be certain that player 2 has
deviated. This additional information makes it possible to provide additional
punishments for deviation and hence to support a larger set of efficient PPE.
As Figure 6 shows, the difference matters: the second reporting rule always
supports a larger set of efficient PPE; indeed, for some values of κ (which
measures the strength of the interference) only the second reporting rule
supports any efficient PPE at all.
More generally, consider a context with n ≥ 3 players. If the identity of
the winner is not announced, all deviations must be “punished” in the same
way, but if the identity of the winner is announced, “punishments” can be
tailored to the deviator, and hence can be more severe. If punishments can
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Figure 6: Largest Achievable Fraction 1− µi/v˜ii as a Function of κ.
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be more severe it may be possible to sustain a wider range of PPE. Which
reporting rule – hence which monitoring structure – should be chosen by the
designer will depend on the tradeoff the designer makes between preserving
privacy and sustaining a wider range of PPE.
Example 3 As we have suggested, the designer must choose from some
(possible) measurement technologies. This choice involves a tension: more
accurate measurement technologies will typically be more costly to employ.
Hence the designer must trade-off the accuracy of the measurement tech-
nology against the cost of employing it. The designer must also choose a
reporting rule, in this case a threshold d0. This choice also involves a ten-
sion, but of a different kind. Given the distribution of shocks and a choice
of measurement technology, the choice of threshold affects the distribution
of signals. How the designer chooses the distribution of signals depends on
what the designer wishes to accomplish. For instance, given a fixed discount
factor, the designer may wish to choose the threshold to maximize the range
of long-run resource allocations that can be supported as PPE for the given
discount factor. Alternatively, the designer may wish to minimize the dis-
count factor for which some long-run resource allocation can be supported
as a PPE.
To give some idea of the effect of these tradeoffs, we present numerical
results for a special case of the Resource Sharing Game with 3 players, ca-
pacity χ = 1 and ε¯ = 0.3. Because the game is symmetric it seems natural
to consider symmetric sets of payoffs; so we consider sets of the form
V (η) = {v ∈ V : vi ≥ ηv˜ for each i}
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Figure 7: Largest Achievable Fraction 1− η as a Function of Threshold d0.
where v˜ is the utility of each player’s most preferred action and η ∈ [0, 1].
Note that 1 − η represents the fraction of the entire efficient set V that is
occupied by V (η). A natural desideratum for the designer is to choose the
threshold d0 so that the fraction 1− η is as large as possible; this maximizes
opportunities for sharing. (As we have shown in Theorem 1, making η smaller
also makes the required discount factor smaller, so the designer can simulta-
neously create more sharing opportunities for less patient players.) Figures
7 and 8 display (from simulations) the relationship between the threshold d0
and the smallest η and smallest δ for different values of the exponent p.
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9. Conclusion
This paper diverges from much of the familiar literature on repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring in two directions. In analyzing the
reduced form, we make different assumptions on the signal structure and ob-
tain stronger conclusions about efficient PPE (bounds on the discount factor,
explicitly constructive strategies). However, we also construct an elaborated
form in which the information structure can be viewed as arising from the
behavior of a strategic designer. Clearly there is much more to be done.
Perhaps most obviously, it is clearly important to understand the extent to
which the assumptions on the signal structure of the reduced form and on the
geometry of the candidate self-generating sets Vµ can be relaxed. However,
we think the elaborated form is of even more potential interest, especially
for applications. As we have discussed in the Examples, the designer must
decide what to observe and what to communicate to the players, and these
choices will typically involve a trade-off between the cost of more accurate
observation and communication on the one hand and the benefits of bet-
ter information on the other hand. It seems natural to suppose that the
costs and benefits – and hence the trade-offs – may be very different across
environments. This seems a subject worthy of much study.
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Appendix
The proof of Proposition 1 is immediate and omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2 Fix an active player i and an inactive player j.
Set
A(i, j) =
{
aj ∈ Aj : uj(aj, a˜i−j) > uj(a˜i)
}
B(i, j) =
{
aj ∈ Aj : uj(aj, a˜i−j) < uj(a˜i), ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j) < ρ(yib|a˜i)
}
If either of A(i, j) or B(i, j) is empty then α(i, j) ≤ β(i, j) by default, so
assume in what follows that neither of A(i, j), B(i, j) is empty.
Fix a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and let σ be PPE that achieves an ef-
ficient payoff. Assume that i is active following some history: σ(h) = a˜i
for some h. Because σ achieves an efficient payoff, we can decompose the
payoff v following h as the weighted sum of the current payoff from a˜i and
the continuation payoff assuming that players follow σ; because σ is a PPE,
the incentive compatibility condition for all players j must obtain. Hence for
all aj ∈ Aj we have
vj = (1− δ)uj(a˜i) + δ
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|a˜i)γj(y)
≥ (1− δ)uj(aj, a˜i−j) + δ
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|aj, a˜i−j)γj(y), (10)
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Substituting probabilities for the good and bad signals yields
vj = (1− δ)uj(a˜i) + δ
[
ρ(yig|a˜i)γj(yig) + ρ(yib|a˜i)γj(yib)
]
≥ (1− δ)uj(aj, a˜i−j) + δ
[
ρ(yig|aj, a˜i−j)γj(yig) + ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)γj(yib)
]
Rearranging yields
[
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
][
γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib)
][ δ
1− δ
]
≥
[
uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
]
Now suppose j 6= i is an inactive player. If aj ∈ A(i, j) then ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)−
ρ(yib|a˜i) > 0 (by Assumption 4) so
[
γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib)
][ δ
1− δ
]
≥ uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
(11)
If aj ∈ B(i, j) then ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i) < 0 (by definition) so
[
γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib)
][ δ
1− δ
]
≤ uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
(12)
Taking the sup over aj ∈ A(i, j) in (11) and the inf over aj ∈ B(i, j) in (12)
yields α(i, j) ≤ β(i, j) as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 3 As above, we assume i is active following the
history h and that v is the payoff following h. Fix ai ∈ Ai. By definition,
ui(a˜
i) > ui(ai, a˜
i
−i). With respect to probabilities, there are two possibilities.
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If ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i) ≤ ρ(yib|a˜i) then we immediately have
v˜ii − ui(ai, a˜i−i) ≥
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λjα(i, j)[ρ(y
i
b|ai, a˜i−i)− ρ(yib|a˜i)]
because the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is non-negative.
If ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i) > ρ(yib|a˜i) we proceed as follows.
We begin with (10) but now we apply it to the active user i, so that for
all ai ∈ Ai we have
vi = (1− δ)ui(a˜i) + δ
[
ρ(yig|a˜i)γi(yig) + ρ(yib|a˜i)γi(yib)
]
≥ (1− δ)ui(ai, a˜i−i) + δ
[
(ρ(yig|ai, a˜i−i)γi(yig) + ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i)γi(yib)
]
Rearranging yields
γi(y
i
g)− γi(yib) ≥
[
1− δ
δ
] [
ui(ai, a˜
i
−i)− ui(a˜i)
ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
]
Because continuation payoffs are in V , which lies in the hyperplane H, the
continuation payoffs for the active user can be expressed in terms of the
continuation payoffs for the inactive users as
γi(y) =
1
λi
[
1−
∑
j 6=i
λjγj(y)
]
Hence
γi(y
i
g)− γi(yib) = −
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λj[γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib)]
Applying the incentive compatibility constraints for the inactive users implies
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that for each aj ∈ A(i, j) we have
γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib) ≥
[
1− δ
δ
] [
uj(aj, a˜
i
−j)− uj(a˜i)
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
]
In particular
γj(y
i
g)− γj(yib) ≥
[
1− δ
δ
]
α(i, j)
and hence
γi(y
i
g)− γi(yib) ≤ −
1
λi
[
1− δ
δ
][∑
j 6=i
λjα(i, j)
]
≤ 0
Putting these all together, canceling the factor [1 − δ]/δ and remembering
that we are in the case ρ(yib|ai, a˜i−i) > ρ(yib|a˜i) yields
v˜ii − ui(ai, a˜i−i) ≥
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λjα(i, j)[ρ(y
i
b|ai, a˜i−i)− ρ(yib|a˜i)]
which is the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Assume that Vµ is regular and not an extreme point,
and is a self-generating set; we verify Conditions 1-4 in turn. Because Vµ is
self-generating and not an extreme point, it cannot be a singleton and hence
must contain an interior point of V . In order for such a point to be achieved
in a PPE, every player must be active following some history, so Propositions
2 and 3 yield Conditions 1 and 2.
By assumption, for each i ∈ N there is a payoff profile vˆi ∈ Vµ with the
property that vˆij = µj for each j 6= i. Necessarily, vˆi is the unique such point
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and vˆi = arg max{vi : v ∈ Vµ}. Because V lies in the hyperplane H we have
vˆij =
 µj if j 6= i1
λi
(
1−∑k 6=i λkµk) if j = i
Because Vµ is self-generating, we can decompose vˆ
i:
vˆi = (1− δ)u(a˜k) + δ
∑
y
ρ(y|a˜k)γ(y) (13)
for some a˜k. If k 6= i then (because Vµ 6= {v˜k}) we must have µk < v˜kk which
implies that γk(y) < µk for some y; since continuation payoffs must lie in
Vµ this is a contradiction. Hence in the decomposition (13) we must have
a˜k = a˜i.
It is convenient to first establish the following inequality on µj on the way
to establishing the bounds in Condition 3.
µj > max
i 6=j
v˜ij for all j ∈ N
To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists a i, j such that µj ≤ v˜ij.
Consider i’s preferred payoff profile vˆi in Vµ. Because decomposing vˆ
i requires
that we use a˜i, it follows that
µj = (1− δ) · v˜ij + δ ·
∑
y
ρ(y|a˜i)γj(y)
If µj < v˜
i
j then
∑
y∈Y ρ(y|a˜i)γi(y) < µj and so γj(y) < µj for some y.
This contradicts that fact that γ(y) ∈ Vµ. If µj = v˜ij, we must have
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∑
y ρ(y|a˜i)γj(y) = µj. Since γj(y) ≥ µj for all y, we must have γj(yig) =
γj(y
i
b) = µj. By assumption, player j has a currently profitable deviation
aj so that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i), which implies that the continuation payoff
γj(y
i
g) = γj(y
i
b) = µj cannot satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints.
Hence, we must have µj > v˜
i
j as asserted.
With all this in hand we derive Condition 3. To do this, we suppose i
is active and examine the decomposition of the inactive player j’s payoff in
greater detail. Because µj > v˜
i
j and vj ≥ µj for every v ∈ Vµ we certainly
have vj > v˜
i
j. We can write j’s incentive compatibility condition as
vj = (1− δ) · v˜ij + δ ·
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|a˜i) · γj(y) (14)
≥ (1− δ) · uj(aj, a˜i−j) + δ ·
∑
y∈Y
ρ(y|aj, a˜i−j) · γj(y).
From the equality constraint in (14), we can solve for the discount factor δ
as
δ =
vj − v˜ij∑
y∈Y γj(y)ρ(y|a˜i)− v˜ij
(Note that the denominator can never be zero and the above equation is well
defined, because vj > v˜
i
j implies that
∑
y∈Y γj(y)ρ(y|a˜i) > v˜ij.) We can then
eliminate the discount factor δ in the inequality of (14). Since vj > v˜
i
j, we
can obtain equivalent inequalities, depending on whether aj is a profitable
or unprofitable current deviation):
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• If uj(aj, a˜i−j) > v˜ij then
vj ≤
∑
y∈Y
γj(y)
[(
1− vj − v˜
i
j
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
ρ(y|a˜i)
+
vj − v˜ij
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
ρ(y|aj, a˜i−j)
]
(15)
• If uj(aj, a˜i−j) < v˜ij then
vj ≥
∑
y∈Y
γj(y)
[(
1− vj − v˜
i
j
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
ρ(y|a˜i)
+
vj − v˜ij
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
ρ(y|aj, a˜i−j)
]
(16)
For notational convenience, write the coefficient of γj(y
i
g) in the above
inequalities as
cij(aj, a˜
i
−j) ,
(
1− vj − v˜
i
j
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
ρ(yig|a˜i)
+
(
vj − v˜ij
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
ρ(yig|aj, a˜i−j)
= ρ(yig|a˜i) + (vj − v˜ij)
(
ρ(yig|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yig|a˜i)
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
= ρ(yig|a˜i)− (vj − v˜ij)
(
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
)
According to (15), if uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > v˜
i
j then
cij(aj, a˜
i
−j) · γj(yig) +
[
1− cij(aj, a˜i−j)
]
γj(y
i
b) ≤ vj (17)
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Since γj(y
i
g) > γj(y
i
b), this is true if and only if
κ+ij · γj(yig) + (1− κ+ij) · γj(yib) ≤ vj, (18)
where κ+ij , sup{cij(aj, a˜i−j) : aj ∈ Aj : uj(aj, a˜i−j) > v˜ij}. (Fulfilling the
inequalities (17) for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i) is equivalent to ful-
filling the single inequality (18). If (18) is satisfied, then the inequalities (17)
are satisfied for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i) because γj(y
i
g) > γj(y
i
b)
and κ+ij ≥ cij(aj, a˜i−j) for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜i−j) > uj(a˜i). Conversely, if
the inequalities (17) are satisfied for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i) and
(18) were violated, so that κ+ij ·γj(yig)+(1−κ+ij) ·γj(yib) > vj, then we can find
a κ′ij < κ
+
ij such that κ
′
ij ·γj(yig)+(1−κ′ij)·γj(yib) > vj. Based on the definition
of the supremum, there exists at least a a′j such that uj(a
′
j, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i) and
cij(a
′
j, a˜
i
−j) > c
′
ij, which means that cij(a
′
j, a˜
i
−j) · γj(yig) + (1 − cij(a′j, a˜i−j)) ·
γj(y
i
b) > vj. This contradicts the fact that the inequalities (18) are fulfilled
for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) > uj(a˜
i).)
Similarly, according to (16), for all aj such that uj(aj, a˜
i
−j) < v˜
i
j, we must
have
cij(aj, a˜
i
−j)γj(y
i
g) + [1− cij(aj, a˜i−j)]γj(yib) ≥ vj.
Since γj(y
i
g) > γj(y
i
b), the above requirement is fulfilled if and only if
κ−ij · γj(yig) + (1− κ−ij) · γj(yib) ≥ vj,
where κ−ij , inf
{
cij(aj, a˜
i
−j) : aj ∈ Aj, uj(aj, a˜i−j) < v˜ij
}
. Hence, the decom-
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position (14) for user j 6= i can be simplified as:
ρ(yig|a˜i) · γj(yig) + [1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]γj(yib) = v˜ij +
vj − v˜ij
δ
κ+ij γj(y
i
g) + (1− κ+ij) · γj(yib) ≤ vj
κ−ij γj(y
i
g) + (1− κ−ij) · γj(yib) ≥ vj (19)
Keep in mind that the various continuation values γ and the expressions
κ+ij, κ
−
ij depend on vj; where necessary we write the dependence explicitly.
Note that there could be many γj(y
i
g) and γj(y
i
b) that satisfy (19). For a
given discount factor δ, we call all the continuation payoffs that satisfy (19)
feasible – but whether particular continuation values lie in Vµ depends on the
discount factor.
We assert that κ+ij(µj) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N and for all j 6= i. To see this, we
look again at player i’s preferred payoff profile vˆi in Vµ, which is necessarily
decomposed by a˜i. We look at the following constraint for player j 6= i in
(19):
κ+ij γj(y
i
g) + (1− κ+ij) γj(yib) ≤ µj.
Suppose that κ+ij(µj) > 0. Since player j has a currently profitable deviation
from a˜i, we must set γj(y
i
g) > γj(y
i
b). Then to satisfy the above inequality,
we must have γj(y
i
b) < µj. In other words, when κ
+
ij(µj) > 0, all the feasible
continuation payoffs of player j must be outside Vµ. This contradicts the fact
that Vµ is self-generating so the assertion follows.
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The definition of κ+ij(µj) and the fact that κ
+
ij(µj) ≤ 0 entail that
κ+ij(µj) = ρ(y
i
g|a˜i)− (µj − v˜ij) inf
aj∈A(i,j)
[
ρ(yib|aj, a˜i−j)− ρ(yib|a˜i)
uj(aj, a˜i−j)− v˜ij
]
= ρ(yig|a˜i)− (µj − v˜ij)
 1
supaj∈A(i,j)
(
uj(aj ,a˜i−j)−v˜ij
ρ(yib|aj ,a˜i−j)−ρ(yib|a˜i)
)

= ρ(yig|a˜i)− (µj − v˜ij)
[
1
α(i, j)
]
≤ 0
This provides a lower bound on µj:
µj ≥ v˜ij + α(i, j)ρ(yig|a˜i) = v˜ij + α(i, j)[1− ρ(yib|a˜i)]
This bound must hold for every i ∈ N and every j 6= i. Hence, we have
µj ≥ max
i 6=j
(
v˜ij + α(i, j)[1− ρ(yib|a˜i)]
)
which is Condition 3.
Now we derive Condition 4 (the necessary condition on the discount fac-
tor). The minimum discount factor δµ required for Vµ to be a self-generating
set solves the optimization problem
δµ = max
v∈Vµ
δ subject to v ∈ B(Vµ; δ)
where B(Vµ; δ) is the set of payoff profiles that can be decomposed on Vµ
under discount factor δ. Since B(Vµ; δ) = ∪i∈NB(Vµ; δ, a˜i), the above opti-
57
Decomposition equality
IC constraint
(currently profitable deviation)
IC constraint
(currently unprofitable deviation)
Feasible 
continuation 
payoffs
Figure 9: Illustrations of the feasible continuation payoffs when κ+ij ≤ 0. γ¯j =
1
λj
(
1−∑k 6=j λkµk).
mization problem can be reformulated as
δµ = max
v∈Vµ
min
i∈N
δ subject to v ∈ B(Vµ; δ, a˜i). (20)
To solve the optimization problem (20), we explicitly express the constraint
v ∈ B(Vµ; δ, a˜i) using the results derived above.
Some intuition may be useful. Suppose that i is active and j is an inactive
player. Recall that player j’s feasible γj(y
i
g) and γj(y
i
b) must satisfy (19).
There are many γj(y
i
g) and γj(y
i
b) that satisfy (19). In Fig. 9, we show the
feasible continuation payoffs that satisfy (19) when κ+ij(vj) ≤ 0. We can
see that all the continuation payoffs on the heavy line segment are feasible.
The line segment is on the line that represents the decomposition equality
ρ(yig|a˜i) · γj(yig) + (1 − ρ(yig|a˜i)) · γj(yib) = v˜ij +
vj−v˜ij
δ
, and is bounded by
the IC constraint on currently profitable deviations κ+ij · γj(yig) + (1 − κ+ij) ·
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γj(y
i
b) ≤ vj and the IC constraint on currently unprofitable deviations κ−ij ·
γj(y
i
g) + (1 − κ−ij) · γj(yib) ≥ vj. Among all the feasible continuation payoffs,
denoted γ′(y), we choose the one, denoted γ∗(y), such that for all j 6= i,
γ∗j (y
i
g) and γ
∗
j (y
i
b) make the IC constraint on currently profitable deviations
in (19) binding. This is because under the same discount factor δ, if there
is any feasible continuation payoff γ′(y) in the self-generating set, the one
that makes the IC constraint on currently profitable deviations binding is
also in the self-generating set. The reason is that, as can be seen from Fig. 9,
the continuation payoff γ∗j (y) that makes the IC constraint binding has the
smallest γ∗j (y
i
g) = min γ
′
j(y
i
g) and the largest γ
∗
j (y
i
b) = max γ
′
j(y
i
b). Formally
we establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Fix a payoff profile v and a discount factor δ. Suppose that v is
decomposed by a˜i. If there are any feasible continuation payoffs γ′(yig) ∈ Vµ
and γ′(yib) ∈ Vµ that satisfy (19) for all j 6= i, there there exist feasible
continuation payoffs γ∗(yig) ∈ Vµ and γ∗(yib) ∈ Vµ such that the IC constraint
on currently profitable deviations in (19) is binding for all j 6= i.
Proof. Given feasible continuation payoffs γ′(yig) ∈ Vµ and γ′(yib) ∈ Vµ, we
construct γ∗(yig) ∈ Vµ and γ∗(yib) ∈ Vµ that are feasible and make the IC
constraint on currently profitable deviations in (19) binding for all j 6= i.
Specifically, we set γ∗j (y
i
g) and γ
∗
j (y
i
b) such that the IC constraint on cur-
rently profitable deviations in (19) is binding. Such γ∗j (y
i
g) and γ
∗
j (y
i
b) have
the following property: γ∗j (y
i
g) ≤ γ′j(yig) and γ∗j (yib) ≥ γ′j(yib) for all γ′j(yig) and
γ′j(y
i
b) that satisfy (19). We prove this property by contradiction. Suppose
that there exist γ′j(y
i
g) and γ
′
j(y
i
b) that satisfy (19) and γ
′
j(y
i
g) = γ
∗
j (y
i
g) −∆
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with ∆ > 0. Based on the decomposition equality, we have
γ′j(y
i
b) = γ
∗
j (y
i
b) +
(
ρ(yig|a˜i)
1− ρ(yig|a˜i)
)
∆
We can see that the IC constraint on currently profitable deviations is vio-
lated:
κ+ij γ
′
j(y
i
g) + (1− κ+ij) γ′j(yib)
= κ+ij γ
∗
j (y
i
g) + (1− κ+ij) γ∗j (yib) +
[
−κ+ij ∆ + (1− κ+ij)
(
ρ(yig|a˜i)
1− ρ(yig|a˜i)
)
∆
]
= vj + (1− κ+ij)
[
ρ(yig|a˜i)
1− ρ(yig|a˜i)
− κ
+
ij
1− κ+ij
]
∆
> vj
where the last inequality results from κ+ij ≤ 0. Hence, we have γ∗j (yig) ≤ γ′j(yig)
and γ∗j (y
i
b) ≥ γ′j(yib) for all γ′j(yig) and γ′j(yib) that satisfy (19).
Next, we prove that if γ′(y) ∈ Vµ, then γ∗(y) ∈ Vµ. To prove γ∗(y) ∈ Vµ,
we need to show that γ∗j (y
i
g) ≥ µj and γ∗j (yib) ≥ µj for all j ∈ N . For j 6= i,
we have γ∗j (y
i
g) ≥ γ∗j (yib) ≥ γ′j(yib) ≥ µj. For i, we have
γ∗i (y
i
g) =
1
λi
(
1−
∑
j 6=i
λjγ
∗
j (y
i
g)
)
≥ 1
λi
(
1−
∑
j 6=i
λjγ
′
j(y
i
g)
)
= γ′i(y
i
g) ≥ µi
This proves the lemma.
Using this Lemma, we can calculate the continuation payoffs of the inac-
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tive player j 6= i:
γj(y
i
g) =
(
1
δ
(1− κ+ij)− [1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]
)
vj − (1δ − 1)(1− κ+ij)v˜ij
ρ(yig|a˜i)− κ+ij
=
vj
δ
−
(
1− δ
δ
)
v˜ij +
(
1− δ
δ
)
[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]α(i, j),
γj(y
i
b) =
[
ρ(yig|a˜i)− 1δκ+ij
]
vj + (
1
δ
− 1)κ+ij v˜ij
ρ(yig|a˜i)− κ+ij
=
vj
δ
−
(
1− δ
δ
)
v˜ij −
(
1− δ
δ
)
ρ(yig|a˜i)α(i, j).
The active player’s continuation payoffs can be determined based on the
inactive players’ continuation payoffs since γ(y) ∈ V . We calculate the active
player i’s continuation payoffs as
γi(y
i
g) =
vi
δ
−
(
1− δ
δ
)
v˜ii −
(
1− δ
δ
)
[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λjα(i, j),
γi(y
i
b) =
vi
δ
−
(
1− δ
δ
)
v˜ii +
(
1− δ
δ
)
ρ(yig|a˜i)
1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λjα(i, j)
Hence, the constraint v ∈ B(Vµ; δ, a˜i) on discount factor δ is equivalent to
γ(y) ∈ Vµ for all y ∈ Y ⇔ γi(y) ≥ µi for all i ∈ N, y ∈ Y
Since κ+ij(µj) ≤ 0, we have γj(y) ≥ vj for all y ∈ Y , which means that
γj(y) ≥ µj for all y ∈ Y . Hence, we only need the discount factor to have
the property that γi(y) ≥ µi for all y ∈ Y . Since γi(yig) < γi(yib), we need
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γi(y
i
g) ≥ µi, which leads to
δ ≥ 1
1 + λi(vi − µi)/
[
λi(v˜ii − vi) +
∑
j 6=i λj · (1− ρ(yig|a˜i))α(i, j)
] .
Hence, the optimization problem (20) is equivalent to
δ(µ) = max
v∈Vµ
min
i∈N
xi(v) (21)
where
xi(v) ,
1
1 + λi(vi − µi)/
(
λi(v˜ii − vi) +
∑
j 6=i λj[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]α(i, j)
)
Since xi(v) is decreasing in vi, the payoff v
∗ that maximizes mini∈N xi(v)
must satisfy xi(v
∗) = xj(v∗) for all i and j. Now we find the payoff v∗ such
that xi(v
∗) = xj(v∗) for all i and j.
Define
z , λi(v
∗
i − µi)
λi(v˜ii − v∗i ) +
∑
j 6=i
λj[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]α(i, j)
Then we have
λi(1 + z)v
∗
i = λi(µi + zv˜
i
i)− z
∑
j 6=i
λj[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]α(i, j)
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from which it follows that
z =
1−∑
i
λiµi
∑
i
(
λiv˜ii +
∑
j 6=i
λj[1− ρ(yig|a˜i)]α(i, j)
)
− 1
Hence, the minimum discount factor is δ(µ) = 1
1+z
; substituting the definition
of z yields Condition 4. This completes the proof that these Conditions 1-4
are necessary for Vµ to be a self-generating set.
It remains to show that these necessary Conditions are also sufficient,
which is accomplished in the proof of Theorem 2. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2 In view of the results of APS, it suffices to show
that the algorithm yields a decomposition of each target vector v(t) ∈ Vµ.
The algebra in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 shows that Conditions
1 and 2 guarantee that the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied
for the inactive and active players. The algebra in the proof of Theorem 1
shows that Conditions 3 and 4 taken together guarantee that the continuation
payoff γ(y) belongs to Vµ for each y ∈ Y . 
Proof of Theorem 3 Given a parameter ξ, the algorithm uses the target
vector as the continuation value to compute N indicators; let Ξ(0) be the
set of parameters for which no two of these indicators are equal. For each
parameter in Ξ(0), the algorithm computes continuation values following the
good signal and the bad signal and then uses each of these continuation
values to compute N indicators; let Ξ(1) ⊂ Ξ(0) be the set of parameters
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for which no two of these indicators are equal. Proceeding by induction, we
define a decreasing sequence of sets Ξ(0) ⊃ Ξ(1) ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ξ(T ); let ΞT be the
complement of Ξ(T ). Notice that the indicators are continuous functions of
the parameters so the ordering of the indicators is locally constant provided
no two indicators are equal. Hence for each ξ ∈ Ξ(T ) = Ξ \ Ξ(T ) then there
is a small open neighborhood Z of ξ so that if ξ′ ∈ Z then the strategies
σξ′ , σξ generate the same ordering of indicators in each of the first T periods.
In particular, σξ′(h) = σξ(h) for each history h ∈ HT ; that is, ξ → σTξ is
locally constant on the complement of ΞT . It remains only to show that ΞT
is closed and has measure 0. In fact, ΞT is a finite union of lower-dimensional
submanifolds; this is a consequence of general facts about semi-algebraic sets
and the observation that all the indicators are continuous semi-algebraic
functions of the parameters, no two of which coincide on any open set. See
Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1998), Blume and Zame (1994).
Proof of Theorem 4 Propositions 2, 3 show that Conditions 1, 2 are
necessary conditions for the existence of an efficient PPE for any discount
factor.. Suppose therefore that Conditions 1,2 are satisfied. It is easily
checked that the definitions of µ1, µ2 guarantee that Condition 3 of Theorem
1 are satisfied. Finally, if δ ≥ δ∗ then Condition 4 of Theorem 1 is also
satisfied. It follows from Theorem 1 that for each δ ≥ δ∗, Vµ is a self-
generating set, so every target vector in Vµ can be achieved in a PPE. Hence
E(δ) ⊃ Vµ for every δ ∈ [δ∗, 1). To see that Vµ = E(δ) for every δ ∈ [δ∗, 1),
simply note that for each δ the set E(δ) is closed and convex, hence an
interval, hence of the form Vµ for some µ. However, Condition 3 of Theorem
1 guarantees that µ ≥ µ which completes the proof. 
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